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I. INTRODUCTION

The Contract with America (the "Contract") was the
centerpiece of the Republican Party's strategy in the 1994
congressional campaigns. The Common Sense Legal Reforms Act
(CSLRA") was the ninth tenet and a critical constituent of the
Contract, which the Republican Party promised that the new
Congress would vote upon within one hundred days. Once the Grand
Old Party swept into office, capturing the House of Representatives
for the first time in four decades, many members of Congress were
expressly committed to honoring the Contract with America.
Accordingly, nearly one hundred Republican sponsors introduced the
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act during the initial week of the
104th Congress, and the measure rapidly progressed through the
House of Representatives.'

1.
See H.R. 10, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 4, 1995). The Republican Party leadership
decided against attempting to pass H.R. 10 in one bill as introduced. Many provisions included
in H.R. 10, therefore, now appear in numerous other pieces of legislation. See, for example,
Common Sense Product Liability Reform Act, H.R. 917, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 13, 1995);
Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb.
15, 1995); Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Feb. 16, 1995);
Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Congress, 1st Sess. (Feb. 27, 1995). The
Republicans have discarded virtually none of the original constituents of H.R. 10, however.
Congress will consider and may ultimately adopt most of the provisions of the CSLRA as
components of other legislation that passed the House of Representatives during the week of
March 6, 1995. See H.R. 956, H.R. 988, and H.R. 1058. For convenience of analysis, I primarly
treat the proposals included in the CSLRA (H.R. 10), supplementing that evaluation with
assessment of specific aspects of the recently passed legislation which are most relevant to the
issues examined in this Essay. Nevertheless, I realize that certain features of the measures
that the House adopted improved H.R. 10 as originally introduced. I intend to emphasize
numerous systemic factors that the legislation implicates, rather than to catalog
comprehensively the particular constituents of the legislation, even while recognizing that the
whole may be more than the sum of its parts.
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This legislation would impose procedural and substantive
reforms that could significantly affect much federal civil litigation and
could have substantial systemic impacts on the civil justice process.
For instance, the measure's advocates drafted and introduced the
proposed legislation with little apparent appreciation for how it might
conflict with a number of ongoing public and private reform initiatives, such as an earlier Congress's Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
and the American Law Institute's efforts to adopt a Third
Restatement of Torts governing products liability.
The bill's enactment, therefore, could additionally complicate
the increasingly complex civil justice system. Indeed, certain of the
measure's provisions may impose greater expense and delay in civil
litigation, thereby exacerbating numerous current problems rather
than producing the reforms' ostensible purpose of ameliorating the
difficulties. These phenomena mean that the Common Sense Legal
Reforms Act warrants analysis. This Essay undertakes that effort.
Part II of this Essay examines the backdrop against which the
proponents of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act drafted the legislation. The Part emphasizes those continuing public and private law
reform efforts with which many provisions of the measure promise to
conflict.
Part III descriptively analyzes the specific procedural and
substantive requirements of the CSLRA and considers particular
provisions' adverse effects on individual cases, ongoing reform
initiatives, and the civil justice system. The Part finds that numerous
statutory prescriptions will have deleterious impacts on plaintiffs and
resource-poor litigants by, for instance, restricting their federal court
access. The act may also disrupt continuing civil justice reform
efforts, thus enhancing complexity and disuniformity in federal civil
procedure and concomitantly increasing litigation cost and delay.
Part IV affords suggestions for the future. These recommendations principally urge Congress to reject or delay the passage of the
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act. If Congress remains unpersuaded
that the legislation will have numerous detrimental effects on much
civil litigation and on the broader civil justice system, or if Congress
At the time that this Essay went to press in early April, the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation was preparing to mark up and vote on the Product
Liability Fairness Act of 1995, S. 565, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 15, 1995), which is the
Senate analogue of H.R. 956, while Senator Orrin Hatch, the Chair of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, was introducing the Civil Justice Fairness Act of 1995, S. 672, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (Apr. 4, 1995), which essentially combines the provisions of H.R. 956 and H.R. 988.
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chooses to proceed for other reasons, it should at least consider additional options. For example, Congress should not enact the CSLRA
provisions that will conflict with ongoing reform initiatives.
II. BACKGROUND OF LEGAL REFORMS

The origins and development of the numerous legal reforms
which comprise the backdrop against which the sponsors of the
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act developed the proposed legislation
warrant comparatively comprehensive treatment in this Essay, al-

though that background has been rather extensively assessed elsewhere.2 Relatively thorough examination is justified because most of
the initiatives have long, rich, and complex histories that inform understanding of the CSLRA, particularly by illustrating how those who
drafted the new measure apparently did so without fully taking into
account earlier endeavors. This Part primarily examines procedural
reforms, by considering initiatives that relate to the processes for
adopting and revising federal civil procedures and by studying certain
federal civil justice reforms, and secondarily explores substantive
reforms, principally by treating efforts regarding products liability
law.
A ProceduralReforms
1. Processes for Adopting and Revising Federal Procedures
After decades of contentious debate, Congress passed the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, which authorized the United States Supreme
Court to prescribe rules of practice for civil cases in the federal district courts.3 The next year, the Court appointed the original Advisory
Committee on the Civil Rules ("Advisory Committee"), which included

2.
See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal
Discovery andthe PoliticsofRulemaking, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795 (1991); Carl Tobias, Improving the
1988 and 1990 JudicialImprovements Act, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1589 (1994).
3.
Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
2071-77 (1988 & Supp. 1993). For additional discussion of this act's origins and implications,
see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1015
(1982); Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987); Carl Tobias, Public Law
Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 270 (1989). I rely
substantially in this section on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1589.
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fourteen practitioners and law professors. 4 The Advisory Committee
completed its draft of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("the
Rules") in 1937, the Supreme Court approved the package as
submitted essentially intact, and the Rules became effective in 1938.r
The members of the Advisory Committee meant to rectify the
difficulties posed by common law and code procedure, such as their
very technical character.6 The drafters sought to write a procedural
code that would be simple, uniform, and trans-substantive; that
would foster the expeditious, inexpensive disposition of civil cases;
and that would encourage merits-based resolution of disputes. 7 The
Federal Rules required every federal district court to apply identical
procedures. 8 Rule 83, however, provided an exception; it permitted
each district to adopt local procedures which were not inconsistent
with the Federal Rules, thereby enabling the courts to undermine the
uniform, simple procedural system that the Rules had instituted. 9
The Federal Rules seemed to work reasonably well during the
thirty years following their adoption. 10 Numerous developments,
however, led to growing dissatisfaction with the Rules by the mid1970s. Many judges and attorneys and a small number of writers
claimed that the federal courts were experiencing a litigation explosion in which parties were filing too many cases, too few of which had

4.
See, for example, Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 971-73; Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at
273.
5.
See Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 970-73; Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 273.
6.
See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of FactPleading Under the FederalRules of Civil
Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 439 (1986) (discussing the technical character of common law
and code procedure and the liberality of F.R.C.P. pleading requirements); Subrin, 135 U. Pa. L.
Rev. at 956-61 (discussing the technical character of common law and code procedure and the
"pro-simplicity theme" proposed by committee members). See also Roscoe Pound, The Causes of
Popular Dissatisfactionwith the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. Rep. 395, 405-06 (1906)
(calling for elimination of "sporting theory" of justice). See generally Charles E. Clark,
Procedure--TheHandmaidofJustice (West, 1965).
7.
See generally Robert M. Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading
of the Rules, 84 Yale L. J. 718 (1975). See also Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 494, 502-15 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, A New Era in
American Civil Procedure,67 A.B_.. J. 1648, 1649-51 (1981); Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 27277 (cited in note 3). See also Resnik, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 498-99, 508 (recounting difficulties of
discerning intent of drafters who worked half-century age); Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 274
(same).
8. See, for example, Subrin, 67 A.B.A. J. at 1650; Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 274-75.
9.
See F.R.C.P. 83 and Advisory Committee Note (finding that the restriction on adoption
of inconsistent local procedures has been honored in the breach).
10. See generally Symposium, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: 1938-1958, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 435 (1958); Resnik, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 515-16 (cited in note 7); Tobias, 74
Cornell L. Rev. at 277-78 (cited in note 3).
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merit." Some judges and lawyers expressed concern about abuse of
the civil litigation process and urged courts to sanction attorneys and
parties who engaged in this activity, while a number of critics asinstituted in the
serted that the uniform, simple, flexible regime
2
complications.
these
possible
Federal Rules made
The proliferation of local procedures became another significant source of growing discontent with federal civil procedure.1 Many
of these local requirements, most of which have been prescribed during the last two decades, are inconsistent with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, provisions of the United States Code, or local procedures in other federal districts.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, the policymaking
arm of the federal courts, responded to these concerns in several
ways. The conference supported the adoption of the 1983 amendments to Federal Rules 7, 11, 16, and 26. The revisions were intended
to be an integrated package that would increase attorneys' responsibilities to act as officers of the court and enhance judicial control over
civil litigation, particularly during the pre-trial process. 4 Rules 16
and 26 respectively increased judicial authority during pre-trial conferences and discovery. 5 The amendments to Rules 16 and 26 em11. See, for example, Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 AD.-A Need for Systematic
Anticipation, in A. Leo Levin and Russell Wheeler, eds., The Pound Conference: Perspectiveson
Justice in the Future 23 (West, 1979); Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have
Good Intentions Gone Awry?, in Levin and Wheeler, eds., The Pound Conference at 211-12. See
also Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 287-89 (reviewing debate over litigation explosion).
12. See, for example, NationalHockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639,
642-43 (1976) (upholding sanctions imposed for disobeyance of discovery orders and recognizing
importance of penalizing and deterring discovery abuse); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975) (decrying the extensive discovery available in securities
litigation); Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980)
(Powell, J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Order's modification
of the F.R.C.P. as too modest to limit the Rules' potential abuse). See generally Arthur R.
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosauror Phoenix, 69 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1984) (giving several
reasons for the inefficiency of the current judicial process).
13. See, for example, N.D. Cal. R. 235-7, reprinted in Robert F. Peckham, The Federal
Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guidinga Casefrom Filingto Disposition, 69 Cal.
L. Rev. 770, 776-77 n.30 (1981) (prescribing preliminary meetings, preparation of pretrial order
by attorneys rather than judge, and other procedural details). See generally Carl Tobias, Civil
Justice Reform and the Balkanization ofFederal Civil Procedure,24 Ariz. St. L. J. 1393 (1992).
14. See OrderAmending FederalRules of Civil Procedure,461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See also
Subrin, 67 A.B.A. J. at 1650 (cited in note 7) (arguing that the amended rules would increase
attorneys' responsibilities and judicial control and would complicate civil procedure). See
generally Carl Tobias, JudicialDiscretionand the 1983 Amendments to the FederalCivil Rules,
43 Rutgers L. Rev. 933 (1991) (discussing the effects of the 1983 amendments on civil litigants);
Arthur R. Miller, The 1983 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure: Promoting
Effective Case Management and Lawyer Responsibility (Fed. Judicial Center, 1984) (discussing
the background, integrated nature, and objectives of the 1983 amendments).
15. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097, 1102, 1104
(1983).
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powered judges to impose sanctions for those provisions' violation,
while Rule 11 mandated that judges sanction those who failed to con16
duct reasonable prefiling inquiries or who fied deficient papers.
The Judicial Conference provided two responses to the
problems posed by local procedural proliferation. It supported the
1985 amendment of Rule 83, specifically requiring that districts adopt
or amend local rules only after affording public notice and opportunity
for comment and which required that individual judges' standing
17
orders not conflict with the Federal Rules or with local rules.
The conference also created the Local Rules Project to
assemble and analyze all local procedures.18 The project undertook a
thoroughgoing study and reported that the district courts had
promulgated five thousand local rules, many of which contravened the
Federal Rules, and that there were thousands of additional local
prescriptions that governed local practice. 9 The conference reacted to
the project's findings by issuing an order that asked all federal
districts to conform these local procedures to the Federal Rules.20
Some judges, attorneys, and commentators expressed growing
concerns with the rule revision processes themselves.21 Congressional
activity may reflect some of this dissatisfaction.
During 1973,
Congress intervened in the national procedural amendment process
and nullified considerable work of Judicial Conference committees by
enacting legislation that replaced the Federal Rules of Evidence that
had been adopted by the Supreme Court the preceding year.22 In

16. Id. at 1100.
17. F.R.C.P. 83.
18. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Report of the Local Rules Project: Local Rules on Civil Practice 1 (Sept. 1989).
See generally Daniel R. Coquillette, Mary P. Squiers, and Stephen N. Subrin, The Role of Local
Rules, 75 A.B.. J. 62 (Jan. 1989) (providing summary of Local Rules Project).
19. See Report of the Local Rules Project at 1. See also Coquillette, Squiers, and Subrin,
75 A.B.A. J. at 62-65 (discussing the significance of the proliferation of local rules).
20. See Telephone Interview with Mary P. Squiers, Project Director, Local Rules Project
(Feb. 21, 1992); Telephone Interview with Stephen N. Subrin, Consultant, Local Rules Project
(Feb. 15, 1992).
21. See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76
Colum. L. Rev. 905 (1976) (suggesting reforms to the exercise of judicial rulemaking powers);
Winifred R. Brown, Federal Rulemaking: Problems and Possibilities (Fed. Judicial Center,
1981) (outlining the rulemaking process and criticizing proposals for change). See also Tobias,
46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1598 n.55 (cited in note 2) (discussing Congress' intervention in national rule
revision).
22. Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975). See also Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act, H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-29
(Aug. 26, 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA-N. 5982, 5987-89 (describing congressional
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1974, Congress postponed for a year the date on which the amended
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure were to take effect.23 During the

Federal Rule of Civil
early 1980s, Congress rewrote a revision of
24
promulgated.
had
Court
the
that
4
Procedure
One half-century after the original Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure became effective Congress passed the Judicial
Improvements and Access to Justice Act ("JIX') of 1988, which was
"intended to modernize, regularize and open the national and local
procedural amendment processes."2 5 The statute was meant to
restore the primacy of, and reinvigorate, the national rule revision
process by opening it to greater public involvement, effectively
analogizing the process to notice-comment rulemaking under the
26
Administrative Procedure Act.

Congress in the JIA correspondingly attempted to ameliorate
the proliferation of local procedures by placing strictures on their
adoption and revision that were similar to those for Federal Rule

intervention by enacting legislation replacing the Federal Rules of Evidence); Act of Jan. 2,
1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
In September 1992, the Judicial Conference, the policymaking arm of the federal courts,
suggested that Chief Justice William Rehnquist reactivate an Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Evidence. In the winter of 1993, Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the committee,
which Judge Ralph K. Winter chairs and which Professor Margaret Berger serves as reporter.
The committee held its initial meeting in May, 1993. Telephone Interview with John Rabiej,
Chief, Rules Support Staff, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (March 23, 1995). See
generally 150 F.R.D. 330 (1994) (affording Advisory Committee membership); 147 F.R.D. 282
(1993) (recommending approval of the amendments to the federal rules of evidence and that
proposed amendment of Rule 702 be referred to new Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of
Evidence). See also Edward R. Becker and Aviva Orenstein, The Federal Rules of Evidence
After Sixteen Years-The Effect of "PlainMeaning" Jurisprudence,The Need for an Advisory
Committee on the Rules ofEvidence, and Suggestions for Selective Revision of the Rules, 60 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 857 (1993).
23. Act of July 30, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-361, 88 Stat. 397 (1974), codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3771 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Howard Lesnick, The FederalRule-Making Process: A Time for Reexamination, 61 AB.A. J. 579, 579 (1975). See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act, H.R. Rep. No. 100-889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5982, 5987 (noting that after 1973 Congress frequently interceded to "delay the effective date of,
disapprove, or modify rules and amendments").
24. See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Amendments Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-462, 96
Stat. 2527 (1983); Paul D. Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63
Notre Dame L. Rev. 733, 733 (1988) (discussing prospects for reform in F.R.C.P. 4).
25. Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1599 (cited in note 2). See also 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5987
(outlining the purposes and providing legislative history of the JIA); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073
(1988 & Supp. 1993) (delineating court rulemaking authority). See generally Mullenix, 69 N.C.
L. Rev. at 830-32 (cited in note 2) (discussing the democratization of the rulemaking process
effected by JIA's passage).
26. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (prescribing administrative procedures
particularly for notice-comment rulemaking); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(b), 2073 (1988 & Supp. 1993)
(delineating court rulemaking powers).
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amendment. 27 The legislation imposed public notice and comment
procedures on all of the districts and required every district to name a
local rules committee to advise all judges of the court in prescribing
and modifying local rules.28 The statute also required each of the
twelve circuit judicial councils to review periodically all local procedures for consistency and to change or abolish those deemed inconsistent.29
The first test of the JIA modifications to the national rule revision process was the adoption of the 1993 Federal Rules amendments.30 I concentrate on the revision in Rule 11 because its 1983
amendment became the most controversial change in the Federal
Rules' history and because the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act
would fundamentally alter the 1993 amendment, effectively reinstituting the 1983 version.31
The 1983 modification of Rule 11 was controversial for several
reasons. That revision's principal purpose was to deter frivolous
litigation by encouraging attorneys to "stop and think" before filing
papers. The Advisory Committee Note which accompanied the
amendment confirmed that deterrence was the revision's primary
objective,2 but the revision also provided that judges might award
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, when the Rule was
contravened33 Numerous lawyers seized on this confusion regarding
the provision's compensatory purpose and invoked the Rule in an
effort to recover attorney's fees, while a number of judges were responsive to these requests and made attorney fee-shifting the sanc4
tion of choice.3

27. See Historical and Revision Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988 & Supp. 1993) (noting
that Congress imposed broad responsibilities on federal judiciary to achieve uniformity of rules).
28. See id. (imposing public notice procedures).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4) (1988). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
30. Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedureand Forms, 146 F.R.D. 401 (1993)
("1993 Amendments).
31. See notes 118-29 and accompanying text. The 1993 amendment of Rule 26 to impose
automatic disclosure was also quite significant. See notes 59-62 and accompanying text. Rule 4
was substantially revised as well. See note 24 and accompanying text.
32. See F.R.C.P. 11, 1983 Advisory Committee's Note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 199-200
(1983) (stressing the new amendment's deterrent function).
33. 1983 amendment of F.R.C.P. 11; F.R.C.P. 11, 1983 Advisory Committee's Note, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983).
34. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended FederalRule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Georgetown L. J. 1313,
1327, 1340 (1986) (discussing confusion); Elizabeth Wiggins, Thomas Willging, and Donna
Stientra, Rule 11: FinalReport to Advisory Committee On Civil Rules of the JudicialConference
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The pursuit of compensation fostered much expensive, unnecessary satellite litigation unrelated to the merits of lawsuits3 5
Unclear phrasing and inconsistent judicial interpretation of the
amendment correspondingly contributed to satellite litigation.36 Some
counsel also employed Rule 11 for strategic purposes, such as threatening less powerful litigants in ways that were intended to discourage
37
their vigorous pursuit of litigation.
Many of the above factors disadvantaged resource-poor litigants, such as civil rights plaintiffs.38 Rule 11 was invoked against,
and sanctions were levied on, civil rights plaintiffs more often than
any other class of federal civil litigant,3 9 and judges correspondingly
imposed large sanctions on some of them. 40 The possibility of Rule 11
sanctions chilled the parties, whose lack of resources and power made
them risk-averse and vulnerable to the Rule's invocation. 41 The 1983
some benefits, such as deterring the pursuit of
amendment did afford
42
litigation.
frivolous
The national rule revision entities-particularly those, such as
the Advisory Committee, which had principal responsibility for developing proposals for rules amendments--faithfully and carefully
implemented the JIA's requirements respecting the revision process.
During August 1991, the Advisory Committee issued a preliminary
draft of proposed amendments and sought and received much public
comment in writing and in two public hearings.4 3 The committee was
of the United States § 1B at 9 (Fed. Judicial Center, 1991) (stating that attorney's fees were
sanction of choice).
35. See, for example, Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 Buff. L. Rev.
485, 514 (1989). See also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1925, 1943-54 (1989) (addressing the
need for lawyers and clients to exercise restraint in consuming judicial resources with Rule 11
litigation).
36. Burbank, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1930-31; Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the
ProposedRevision of Rule 11, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1775, 1776 (1992).
37. See, for example, Carl Tobias, ReconsideringRule 11, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 855, 876-77
(1992) (discussing Rule 11's "threat and retreat" aspect). See also Nelken, 74 Georgetown L. J.
at 1327, 1340 (cited in note 34) (noting the high level ofRule 11 motions in civil rights cases).
38. Id.; Tobias, 37 Buff. L. Rev. at 503-06 (cited in note 35) (referring to the Rule's "chilling
effect"); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A CriticalAnalysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 200-01 (1988) (same).
39. Nelken, 74 Georgetown L. J. at 1327, 1340; Vairo, 118 F.R.D. at 200-01.
40. See, for example, Blue v. United States Departmentof the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 548-49
(4th Cir. 1990); In re Kunstler,914 F.2d 505, 513-21 (4th Cir. 1990).
41. See Tobias, 37 Buff. L. Rev. at 495-98 (cited in note 35); Vairo, 118 F.R.D. at 200-01
(cited in note 38).
42. Arthur R. Miller, The New CertificationStandard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 50305 (1990); William W Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1014-15 (1988).
43. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments of FederalRules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53 (1991) ("PreliminaryDraft of
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responsive to publid criticism and apparently made good faith efforts
to improve the drafts.

It even inverted the usual rule revision

sequence for Rule 11 by soliciting public comment prior to drafting a
44
proposal.
Notwithstanding the Committee's thorough evaluation of the
1983 amendment, its responsiveness to public input, and its attempt
45
to write a new Rule that would fairly treat all federal civil litigants,
most parties which would have been affected by the preliminary draft

of Rule 11 expressed dissatisfaction with the proposal. 46 For instance,
resource-poor litigants found that the draft was insufficiently responsive to the difficulties of satellite litigation and chilling effects.
Defense counsel were troubled by the draft's restrictions on recovery
of attorney's fees for Rule violations.
The Advisory Committee responded to this criticism by writing
several additional drafts and by attempting to develop the fairest,
clearest revision possible.47 Indeed, the committee endeavors represent the type of open, responsive revision process and rational decisionmaking that Congress envisioned when changing the rule revision
48
process in the 1988 Act.

Despite the committee's commendable efforts, numerous individuals and interests continued to oppose the 1993 revision. 49 The
most prominent critic was Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia,
who dissented from the Supreme Court's transmittal of the amended

ProposedAmendments"). See also Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil ProcedureRevisited, 14 Natl L.
J. 1, 12-13 (May 4, 1992) (discussing preliminary draft and public comment). See generally Hon.
William J. Hughes, CongressionalReaction to the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,18 Seton Hall Legis. J. 1 (1993)
44. See Advisory Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Call for Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
Related Rules, as Amended in 1983, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) ("Callfor Written Comments').
45. See Tobias, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 861-65 (cited in note 37) (discussing these aspects
of the committee's actions); Call for Written Comments, 131 F.R.D. at 345 (outlining the
committee's plan and goals concerning public comments on the 1983 amendment).
46. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1608 (cited in note
2). See also Carl Tobias, Rule Revision Roundelay, 1992 Wis. L. Rev. 236, 236-39 (describing
dissatisfaction with preliminary draft in a letter to the editors).
47. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, ProposedAmendments to FederalRules of Civil Procedure46 (July 1992); Tobias,
46 U. Miami L. Rev. at 859-65 (cited in note 37); Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of FederalRule
11, 70 Ind. L. J. 171, 176-88 (1994) (tracing the process employed in drafting the amended Rule).
48. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text. See generally Mullenix, 69 N.C. L. Rev. 795
(cited in note 2); Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal Civil Rulemaking, 61
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 455 (1993).
49. See Tobias, 70 Ind. L. J. at 186-88 (cited in note 47) (discussing the Supreme Court
and Congressional objections).
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Rule, contending that it would "eliminate a significant and necessary
deterrent to frivolous litigation. 50
In the final analysis, the 1993 revision of Rule 11 is significantly better than the 1983 amendment. The 1993 revision includes a
safe harbor for parties who allegedly contravene the Rule, specifically
excludes discovery from the provision's purview, entrusts sanctioning
for Rule violations to judicial discretion, and sharply restricts those
instances in which courts can impose the sanction of attorney's fees.51
Therefore, the 1993 version should decrease incentives to invoke the
Rule improperly and correspondingly reduce expense and delay ascribed to satellite litigation. The new Rule 11 is a balanced, workable
compromise, given the restraints on rule revision, such as the need to
satisfy constituencies as diverse as the federal judiciary and plaintiffs'
and defense counsel.
The 1988 JIA requirements relating to local rule revision have
received limited implementation as compared to the national rule
amendment provisions exemplified by the 1993 modification of Rule
11.52 Most of the ninety-four districts have named local rules committees. A number of districts have formalized processes for promulgating and changing local procedures and have opened the processes to
public participation, while some have adopted new, or revised, existing local procedures pursuant to the processes.
Only a small number of districts have effectuated the JIA's
mandates relating to local procedural proliferation. 53 For instance, a
minuscule number of courts have attempted to limit local procedural
requirements, and virtually none have modified inconsistent local
procedures. The Seventh Circuit Judicial Council may be the sole
council that has modified or abrogated conflicting local requirements.
Numerous considerations probably explain the limited effectuation of this aspect of the Judicial Improvements Act. Perhaps
most important, as discussed in detail below, civil justice reform
initiatives, principally instituted by Congress in the Civil Justice
Reform Act ("CJRA") of 1990, but also by the Executive Branch in
50. See Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedureand Forms, reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 402, 507-10 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Dissenting Statement").
51. See F.R.C.P. 11(c)-(d), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; Tobias, 77 Iowa L. Rev. at
1783-88 (cited in note 36). Anecdotal evidence suggests that the amendment has had its intended effects. See Laura Duncan, Sanctions Litigation Declining, 81 A.B.A. J. 12, 12 (March
1995).
52. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1604-06 (cited in
note 2); Carl Tobias, Suggestions for CircuitCourt Review of Local Procedures, 52 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 359 (1995).
53. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1605. See also
Tobias, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 366 (affording examples in Fourth Circuit).
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Executive Order 12,778 issued in 1991, effectively suspended the
efforts of judges, districts, local rules committees, and circuit judicial
councils that might have treated local procedural proliferation.
2. Federal Civil Justice Reform
a. CongressionalCivil Justice Reform
Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 out of
growing concern over increasing cost and delay in civil litigation.54
The legislation required that all ninety-four districts adopt civil justice expense and delay reduction plans. These plans could include
eleven statutorily-prescribed procedures-principally relating to
judicial case management, discovery, and alternatives to dispute
resolution ("ADR")-and any other measures that would decrease cost
or delay. 55 The CJRA also created circuit review committees to
monitor district court implementation and assigned the Judicial
56
Conference similar responsibility.
The legislation implicitly encouraged courts to adopt procedures that conflict with the Federal Rules, provisions in the United
States Code, and requirements in other districts. 57 Most of the courts
prescribed permutations of the eleven statutorily-enumerated measures, and numerous courts promulgated other procedures pursuant to
a twelfth, open-ended provision. For instance, a number of districts
relied on the eleven listed prescriptions to adopt local procedures
which implemented automatic, or mandatory pre-discovery,
disclosure, a controversial, nontraditional discovery technique.s

54.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (1988 & Supp. 1993). I rely substantially in this subsection on

Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1601-04.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1988 & Supp. 1993). All districts were to adopt plans by
December 1, 1993, and to experiment with procedures for three years.
See Notes on
Implementation of Plans accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 474 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Tobias, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. at 1406-11 (cited in
note 13).
57. See 28 U.S.C. § 473 (1988 & Supp. 1993). See generally Lauren K. Robel, Fractured

Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1447 (1994). The Rules
Enabling Act states that local rules must be "consistent with Acts of Congress" and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
58. See, for example, United States District and Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Idaho, Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 10-11 (Dec. 1, 1991); United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York, Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 4-5 (Dec. 17,
1991).
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This experimentation with disclosure became particularly
problematic because the national rule revisors were simultaneously
considering an amendment to Federal Rule 26 that would have imposed disclosure nationwide.i 9 The revision entities ultimately
adopted a Federal Rule amendment that was intended to accommodate CJRA experimentation with disclosure by permitting all ninetyfour districts to vary the provision or to reject it.60 Because Congress

failed at the eleventh hour to delete the Rule 26 amendment
prescribing disclosure, and because numerous districts apparently
61
failed to plan for other contingencies, considerable confusion arose.
Districts eventually adopted a broad array of disclosure procedures
and a number of courts eschewed disclosure; these developments have
62
increased inconsistency, cost, and delay.
The Eastern District of Texas most boldly and clearly asserted
district court authority to adopt inconsistent local procedures when it
declared that, insofar as the "Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
inconsistent with [the Court's] Plan, the Plan has precedence and is
controlling. 63 The district imposed a maximum fee schedule for contingent fee cases not governed by fee-shifting legislation, although the
Supreme Court has specifically proclaimed that Congress, not the
judiciary, is to allocate the costs of litigation.6
The difficulties created by the adoption of a broad range of
disparate procedures in the ninety-four districts have been compounded by inconsistent judicial construction of the provisions and by
the refusal of a number of judges to apply some measures which their
courts have adopted. 6 5 Attorneys and parties have also experienced

59. PreliminaryDraft of Proposed Amendments, 137 F.R.D. at 87-88 (cited in note 43).
See also Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1611 (cited in note 2) (discussing the circumstances surrounding the Advisory Committee's preliminary draft prescribing automatic disclosure).
60. 1993 Amendments, 146 F.R.D. at 431 (cited in note 30). See also Tobias, 46 Stan. L.
Rev. at 1612 (suggesting that the Advisory Committee changed its position to accommodate
efforts proceeding under the CJRA).
61. Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1612-14.
62. Id. at 1614-15.
63. See United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan 9 (Dec. 20, 1991).
64. Id. at 7-8. See KaiserAluminum & Chemical Corporationv. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827,
834-35 (1990) (concluding that the "allocation of the costs accruing from litigation is a matter for
the legislature, not the courts'; Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. The Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240, 247, 262, 271 (1975) (stating that distribution of litigation costs and attorney's fees
is for Congress rather than for courts).
65. Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1621 (cited in note 2).
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considerable difficulty locating, understanding, and complying with
66
the applicable local requirements.
The increasingly complex and disuniform state of federal civil
procedure has increased the expense and delay of federal civil litigation. All parties, but particularly those with limited resources and
those who participate in litigation in multiple districts, have experi67
enced cost and delay.
These developments also show how the 1990 CJRA's implementation essentially suspended those features of the 1988 JIA which
were intended to address local procedural proliferation.68 For instance, circuit judicial councils may well have been reluctant to scrutinize, much less abolish, inconsistent local procedures that the 1990
statute apparently authorized. 69 Indeed, the Sixth Circuit Judicial
Council suspended its review of local rules pending guidance from
Congress, the Judicial Conference, or case law on whether the CJRA
took precedence over the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.70
b. Executive Branch Civil Justice Reform
The Administration of President George Bush briefly experimented with civil justice reform in the executive branch7 1 The
President issued Executive Order 12,778 on October 23, 1991, and the
order took effect in January 1992.72 During that month, the United
States Justice Department promulgated preliminary guidelines to
help federal administrative agencies and government attorneys implement the executive order, and in January 1993 the department

66. Id. See also Tobias, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. at 1422-25 (cited in note 13) (discussing the
implications of "increased balkanization" and of locating, understanding, and complying with
local requirements for the participants in federal civil litigation).
67. See Tobias, 24 Ariz. St. L. J. at 1422-23; Tobias, 37 Buff. L. Rev. at 495-98 (cited in
note 35) (discussing particular problems for litigants with limited resources, such as numerous
civil rights plaintiffs).
68. See notes 27-29, 52-53 and accompanying text.
69. The CJRA also created analogous entities, circuit review committees, and assigned
them similar oversight responsibilities. See note 56 and accompanying text.
70. See United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Minutes of the Meeting of the
JudicialCouncil 4-5 (May 4, 1994). See also Tobias, 52 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. at 365-66 (cited in
note 52) (describing implementation in the Fourth Circuit).
71. I rely substantially in this subsection on Carl Tobias, Executive Branch Civil Justice
Reform, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1521 (1993).
72. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 10, 3 C.F.R. 359, 367 (1991) (stating that order is effective 90 days after signing).
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finalized the guidelines. 73 The order and the accompanying guidelines
include numerous expense- and delay-reduction procedures that apply
to the government when it participates in federal civil litigation; those
strictures which are most relevant to the issues considered in this
Essay will be examined.
Section 1(a) of Executive Order 12,778 requires attorneys for
the government to undertake reasonable efforts to notify potential
defendants of the government's intent to file suit while affording the
persons an opportunity to settle the dispute. 74 The timing and content
of reasonable efforts must be tailored to the circumstances of individual cases, and government counsel need not provide notice in unusual
instances, such as situations when notice would tactically disadvan75
tage the United States.
Section 1(d)(4) of the Executive Order covers the disclosure of
core information. 76 This subsection requires that government lawyers
offer to engage in the mutual exchange of certain significant information early in civil suits. 77 Attorneys can only make these offers when
no dispositive motions are pending, when other litigants agree to
exchange similar material, and when the court will enter the agree78
ment as a stipulated order.

73. Memorandum of PreliminaryGuidanceon Implementationof the LitigationReforms of
Executive Order No. 12,778, 57 Fed. Reg. 3640 (1992) ("Preliminary Memorandum");
Memorandum of Guidanceon Implementation of the Reforms of Executive OrderNo. 12,778, 58
Fed. Reg. 6015 (1993) ("Memorandum"). The Department of Justice only issued this
memorandum on January 25, 1993, five days after the inauguration of William Jefferson
Clinton as the forty-second President of the United States. Id. at 6015.
74. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(a), 3 C.F.R. at 360 (cited in note 72). See also
PreliminaryMemorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641 (stating that notice may be provided either by
agency or litigating counsel for purpose of settling dispute).
75. See PreliminaryMemorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641 (stating that notice is not needed
when it would defeat purpose of litigation); Memorandum, 58 Fed. Reg. at 6016 (cited in note
73) (noting that agency efforts to resolve disputes prior to litigation can afford requisite notice
and stating that government counsel need not repeat notice unless additional notice would be
productive).
76. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(d)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 361 (cited in note 72) (noting that
"core information" includes names and addresses of people having relevant information and
location of relevant documents); PreliminaryMemorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641-42 (discussing
§ 1(d)(1) of order, which requires government counsel to make reasonable efforts to reach
agreement with opposing parties regarding exchange of information).
77. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(d)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 361. See PreliminaryMemorandum, 57
Fed. Reg. at 3641-42 (discussing requirement that government attorneys must offer to exchange
certain information at early stage of litigation).
78. PreliminaryMemorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3641-42. See also Memorandum, 58 Fed.
Reg. at 6017 (cited in note 73) (suggesting that agreement between parties, unless local practice
warrants otherwise, should be by consent order to guarantee court enforcement).
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Section 1(e) of the Executive Order mandates that government
counsel introduce only dependable expert testimony7 9 The attorneys
must rely on experts who have specialized knowledge, who have performed research, or who have other expertise in the applicable field
and have premised their decisions on explanatory theories which are
accepted by at least a substantial minority of experts in the area. 80
Section 1(h) requires that government counsel offer to enter
agreements with their opposition, prescribing two-way fee-shifting to
the extent permitted by applicable law. 81 Because the Attorney
General's review of relevant authority indicated that no legislation
specifically authorized such agreements, 82 the Justice Department
instructed government lawyers that they should not offer to enter
these agreements until Congress enacts legislation or the Attorney
General affords the requisite authority.83
Several factors complicate efforts to ascertain precisely how
executive branch civil justice reform has been implemented. First,
the Bush Administration did not fully effectuate the reforms adopted
because the Justice Department only finalized its guidelines in the
Administration's waning days.8 Second, the Clinton Administration
has left the Executive Order in effect and has made no affirmative

79. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62 (cited in note 72). See also
PreliminaryMemorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3642-43 (noting that existing widely used practice
among government attorneys to employ only reliable experts enhances government's position in
litigation).
80. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § i(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62 (describing proper use of expert
testimony, defining reliable expert testimony, and requiring litigation counsel to engage in
mutual disclosure of expert witness information to extent other party agrees to comparable
disclosure).
81. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 1(h), 3 C.F.R. at 362-63 (requiring that in civil litigation
involving disputes over federal contracts pursuant to 41 U.S.C. 88 601-613 or in any civil litigation initiated by United States, litigation counsel shall offer to enter agreement whereby losing
party pays prevailing party's legal fees and costs); PreliminaryMemorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at
3643 (cited in note 73) (noting that order directs Attorney General to review legal basis for feeshifting agreements).
82. See PreliminaryMemorandum, 57 Fed. Reg. at 3643 (observing absence of legislative
authority for fee-shifting agreements).
83. Id. at 3643. The department correctly resolved this issue. The Supreme Court recently declared that the "allocation of the costs accruing from litigation is a matter for the
legislature, not the courts." Kaiser Aluminum, 494 U.S. at 835. Moreover, Congress has
expressly rejected two-way fee-shifting while passing nearly 200 statutes prescribing one-way
fee-shifting. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (appendix to opinion of Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
84. See note 73 and accompanying text.
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decision respecting the reform, 85 although a Justice Department Task
Force on Civil Justice Reform has been studying, and will soon issue
recommendations regarding the administration's position on, civil
justice reform. 88
It is possible, nonetheless, to afford some rather generalized
insight into the implementation of executive branch civil justice reform. 87 Because government lawyers have undertaken only limited

effectuation of the Executive Order and the Justice Department
guidelines, the efforts thus far may be characterized as somewhat
sporadic. 88 Although individual lawyers have varied in the rigor and
seriousness with which they have implemented the reform, there has
been more, albeit limited, compliance within the Justice Department
than among federal agencies or United States Attorneys' offices.89
Experimentation with the different facets of executive branch reform
has also been variable. For example, government lawyers have effectuated more comprehensively the aspects of the order that resemble
federal procedural rules.90 Government attorneys have correspondingly implemented ADR less broadly because of lingering concerns
over how best to effectuate the alternatives.9 1
The checkered status of implementation of executive branch
civil justice reform has had detrimental effects similar to those
resulting from civil justice reform pursuant to the CJRA. For
instance, the possibility that additional procedural requirements
might apply in civil cases involving the government further
complicates federal civil procedure by requiring that parties find,
master, and conform to those requirements. Insofar as the executive
branch strictures apply, they increase complexity, disuniformity,
expense, and delay and may thwart efforts to limit local procedural
92

proliferation.

85. This is premised on conversations with numerous individuals, principally lawyers who
work in the Department of Justice and in Congress, who are familiar with the administration's
civil justice reform efforts.
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. I rely substantially in the remainder of this paragraph on Tobias, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at
1538-39 (cited in note 71).
89. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, Director of Torts Branch, Civil Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 1993).

90.

Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, Special Counsel to the Assistant

Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Jan. 29, 1993).
91. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad (cited in note 89).
92. In these ways, executive branch reform resembles reform under the CJRA. See notes
54-70 and accompanying text. The Bush Administration also proposed civil justice reform
legislation that included numerous provisions that were similar to those in Executive Order
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3. A Note on State Procedures and State Civil Justice Reform
Many of the above ideas regarding federal procedural revision
processes and federal civil justice reform may have applicability to
analogous processes and reforms in the states. For instance, a number of state court systems have modelled their civil procedure rules on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have premised their rule
93
amendment schemes on the federal system.
Many jurisdictions have correspondingly participated in some
form of civil justice reform. 94 Numerous states have created "futures
commissions" to plan for their courts and civil litigation, 95 while most
jurisdictions have experimented with a broad range of procedures for
expediting cases and reducing litigation costs. 96

These procedural

revision processes and reforms are accorded little additional treatment in this Essay because they are less relevant than the federal
processes and reforms to the CSLRA and to the issues treated here
and because they vary significantly97
12,778. See Access to Justice Act of 1992, S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 3, 1992). See also
Tobias, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1540-41 (cited in note 71) (analyzing S. 2180).

93. See generally John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2059 (1989) (discussing
the advantages of having state rules which conform to the Federal Rules). See also John B.
Oakley and Arthur F. Coon, The FederalRules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems
of Civil Procedure, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1367, 1377-78 (1986) (same); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Discovery Vices and Trans-SubstantiveVirtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 2237, 2237 (1989) (stating that "within almost every state, a procedure based on the
Federal Rules governs most types of civil litigation"); Subrin, 67 A.B.A. J. at 1650 (cited in note
7) (discussing the fact that proponents of the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 argued that the uniform Federal Rules would be a model adopted by the states).
94. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Edward F. Sherman, A Process Model and
Agenda for Civil JusticeReforms in the States, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1553 (1994).
95. See generally Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Reinventing Justice 2022:
Report of the ChiefJustice's Commission on the Futureof the Courts (1992). See also Ira Pilchen
and Sandra Ratcliff,American JudicatureSociety, The Futureand the Courts: Conducting State
Court FuturesActivities (A.J.S., 1993); James A. Dater and Sharon J. Rodgers, State Justice
Institute and American Judicature Society, Alternative Futures for the State Courts of 2020
(A.J.S., 1991).
96. States have conducted much of this experimentation in the broad areas of case management, discovery, and alternative dispute resolution. See Sherman, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 155687 (cited in note 94). The state experimentation thus resembles federal civil justice reform, but
numerous states commenced their efforts earlier than the federal endeavors. See notes 54-92
and accompanying text; Sherman, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1556-60 (discussing certain differences
between federal and state court civil justice reform efforts).
97. For a striking example of a provision in the new legislation which substantially intrudes on state procedural prerogatives, see notes 170, 174, 178 and accompanying text. The
material below on substantive reforms alludes to certain aspects of the processes and reforms.
See notes 99-117, 154-79 and accompanying text. For more treatment of state civil justice
reform, see generally Sherman, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1553. Finally, it is important to remember
that, insofar as the civil procedures applied in federal and state courts within specific states
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B. Substantive Reforms
1. Products Liability
The articulation of, and change in, substantive products liability law has traditionally been the province of the states. 8 State supreme courts have assumed primary responsibility for creating and
modifying products liability doctrine, principally through common law
development.9 9 The American Law Institute's issuance of the
Restatement of Torts (Second) Section 402A in 1965 profoundly influenced the direction of products liability law, and Section 402A's formulation of the strict liability base for products liability literally
swept the nation. 100 More than forty states have subscribed to the
Restatement articulation or to the common law enunciation of strict
liability that the California Supreme Court formulated in Greenman
v. Yuba Power Products.'0 ' Numerous state legislatures have adopted
statutes which codify or change certain features of the Restatement

differ, this phenomenon additionally complicates the efforts of practitioners in those states to
practice in both court systems. See Subrin, 67 A.B.A. J. at 1650 (cited in note 7); Oakley and
Coon, 61 Wash. L. Rev. at 1377-78 (cited in note 93).
98. Efforts that have been undertaken to convince Congress to pass federal products
liability legislation deserve only limited treatment in this essay as they have somewhat less
relevance to the issues treated here. For more than a decade, members of Congress have
introduced a number of federal product liability bills, although none has passed. See, for
example, Product Liability Reform Act, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 31, 1993) (noting that
product liability has traditionally been left to states); 138 Cong. Rec. S13145 (Sept. 10, 1992)
(statement of Senator Kasten) (noting that a number of Senators had been working for years on
product liability reform); David G. Savage, Senate Defeats Federal Product Liability Law
Legislation, L.A. Times Dl (Sept. 11, 1992). The proposals have addressed a broad range of
issues relating to products liability. The most important provisions govern the basis for
imposing liability, but additional significant aspects cover statutes of limitation and repose,
proof, defenses, and punitive damages, among others. See, for example, Product Liability
Reform Act, S. 687, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 31, 1993) (seeking to create uniform national
standards of product liability law governing such issues as product seller liability, awards of
punitive damages, and time limits for liability). See also Product Liability Reform Act, Report of
the Senate Commerce Committee on S. 687, S. Rep. No. 103-203, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. 20-58
(Nov. 20, 1993) (providing summary of major provisions of S. 687 as well as a section-by-section
analysis of the bill's major provisions); note 102 and accompanying text (discussing state
legislative reforms).
99. I rely substantially here on William Prosser and W. Page Keeton, The Law of Torts
677-724 (West, 5th ed. 1984). See generally Carl T. Bogus, War on the Common Law: The
Struggleat the Center of ProductsLiability,60 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1995).
100. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965); Prosser and Keeton, The Law of
Torts at 694 (asserting that § 402A swept the country).
101. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). Alaska is one jurisdiction that follows Greenman.
See Clary v. 5th Avenue Chrysler Center,454 P.2d 244, 247-48 (Alaska 1969); Shanks v. Upjohn,
835 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Alaska 1992).
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formulation or which modify various aspects of the case law doctrine
10 2

of strict products liability.
The strict liability base of products liability has been controversial. Some courts and a few writers have found the strict manner
in which liability has been imposed for product defects too inflexible. 10s Manufacturers and other potential defendants have asserted
that strict liability unfairly exposes them to excessive liability, substantially raises the cost of insurance, and complicates efforts to de10 4
sign, manufacture, advertise, and sell products.
The American Law Institute recently decided to draft a
Restatement Third of Torts governing products liability. 0 5 The ALI
commissioned Professor James Henderson and Professor Aaron
Twerski to serve as reporters for the project.06 The reporters, working with a group of advisors, completed a draft, which the Institute
considered at its annual meeting in May 1994.107
The draft tendered proved to be controversial for several reasons. A number of observers contended that the proposed language of
the Restatement limited too sharply the strict liability base and possibly returned products liability law to negligence in several respects. 0 8 Concomitant criticisms were that certain phrasing of the
102. See, for example, Mont. Code Ann. §§ 27-1-719, 720 (1993); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A58C1 to C-5 (West, 1987). See generally John W. Wade, Victor E. Schwartz, Kathryn Kelly, and
David F. Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases and Materials on Torts 807-08
(Foundation, 9th ed. 1994).
103. See, for example, Prentis v. Yale Mfg. Co., 421 Mich. 670, 365 N.W. 2d 176, 185-86
(1984) (adopting negligence based risk-utility test in product liability actions predicated on
design defects); Grundberg v. Upjohn, 813 P.2d 89, 92 (Utah 1991) (holding that sellers of
certain unavoidably unsafe products should not be held strictly liable for "unfortunate consequences arising from their use"); Sheila Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for DesignDefect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 644-49 (1980)
(criticizing application of strict liability standard to design defect claims); James Henderson and
Aaron Twerski, DoctrinalCollapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failureto Warn,
65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 265, 271-89 (1990) (arguing that negligence should emerge as prevailing
theory in failure to warn cases).
104. See, for example, Peter Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences
3-10 (Basic Books, 1988) (cataloging costs associated with current product liability "tax"); W. Kip
Viscusi, Reforming Products Liability 14-41 (Harvard U., 1991) (outlining dimensions of liability
crisis). See also Teresa Moran Schwartz, PrescriptionProducts and the ProposedRestatement
(Third), 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1357, 1360 (1994).
105. See Restatement (Third) of the Law, Torts: Products Liablity, Tentative Draft No. 1
(April 12, 1994) ("Tentative Draft No. 1").
106. See Henry J. Reske, Experts Tackle Torts Restatement, 78 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (Aug. 1992).
See generally James A. Henderson and Aaron D. Twerski, A Proposed Revision of Section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1512 (1992).
107. See Tentative Draft No. 1 (cited in note 105).
108. See, for example, Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The
ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand. L. Rev. 631, 688-91 (1995); Gerald F. Tietz, Strict Products
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provision and some of its accompanying commentary failed to restate

the law, which currently provides for strict liability.109 After rather
contentious floor debate, the ALI membership agreed in principle that
the reporters should continue in the general direction that they were
proceeding and that the entire body would reconsider the draft at its
May 1995 annual meeting.110
2. Fee-Shifting
Although fee-shifting may be characterized as substantive or
procedural, it warrants brief examination here. Fee-shifting has traditionally been governed by the American Rule which, absent statute
or contract, requires each party to pay its own attorney's fees.,
Congress has generally left fee-shifting to the states, although it has
passed approximately two hundred statutes which provide for feeshifting, almost exclusively in federal question cases.1 2 Most of this
legislation prescribes fee shifts to encourage the pursuit of certain
forms of litigation which vindicate important social policies. For
instance, Congress has inserted fee-shifting provisions in civil rights
statutes to facilitate litigation by individuals and groups who have
suffered discrimination and to deter those who might discriminate
from doing so. Congress has similarly prescribed fee-shifting in

Liability, Design Defects and CorporateDecision-Making: GreaterDeterrence Through Stricter
Process, 38 Vill. L. Rev. 1361, 1362-63 (1993). See also Jerry Phillips, The Proposed Products
LiabilityRestatement: A MisguidedRevision, 10 Touro L. Rev. 151, 181 (1993).
109. See, for example, Larry S. Stewart, The American Law Institute and Products
Liability: 'Restatement or Reform"?, Trial 29-30 (Sept. 1994); Telephone Interview with Gerald
F. Tietz, Professor of Law, Temple University and ALI member (March 23, 1995). See generally
Roland F. Banks and Margaret O'Connor, Restatingthe Restatement (Second), Section 402ADesign Defect, 72 Or. L. Rev. 411 (1993) (arguing that draft of § 402A fails to reflect existing
law). See also Jerry J. Phillips, Achilles' Heel, 61 Tenn. L. Rev. 1265, 1265 (1994) (asserting
that the two reporters' writings over the last two decades indicate "conservative penchant
toward negligence and manufacturer-protective rules").
110. See ALI Hesitates On Lawyer Liability, Product Liability Restatement Efforts, 62
U.S.L.W. 2734, 2735-36 (1994); Stewart, Trial at 29-30. See also Restatement (Third) of the
Law, Torts: Products Liability, Tentative Draft No. 2 (March 13, 1995).
111. See, for example, Alyeska Pipeline,421 U.S. at 257 (noting general rule that litigants
pay their own attorney's fees); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 4-7 (1973) (discussing circumstances
under which fee-shifting may occur, notwithstanding American Rule of disfavoring award of
attorney's fees). See also John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney
Fee Recovery, L. & Contemp. Probs. 9, 13-27 (Winter 1984) (tracing development of American
Rule). See generally John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured
Person'sAccess to Justice,42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1567 (1993) (discussing exceptions to the American
Rule).
112. See note 83; Vargo, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. at 1587-89 (noting that, notwithstanding the
American Rule, a large number of federal and state statutes provide for fee-shifting).
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natural resources legislation to facilitate environmental cleanup or to
3
prevent pollution.1l
Proposals which would require losing parties to pay their opponents' legal fees are grounded on the above concerns, such as the
litigation explosion, litigation abuse, and manufacturers' substantial
exposure in products liability cases," 4 as well as arguable concerns
involving fairness and increased litigation expenses. An example is
the provision for fee-shifting that the Bush Administration included
in its legislative proposal for civil justice reform.1 5 The proposal was
premised on the recommendations of the Council on Competitiveness
Working Group on Civil Justice Reform and appeared in that entity's
August 1991 report." 6 The fee-shifting provision would have entitled
the prevailing litigant to recover attorney's fees "only to the extent
that such party prevailed on any position or claim advanced during
n7
the action.""
III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON SENSE LEGAL REFORMS ACT

This section selectively analyzes the reform proposals that the
sponsors of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act have included in
the legislation. I descriptively evaluate the provisions, attempt to
provide the reasons for their inclusion in the CSLRA, and critically
assess their requirements, particularly in terms of potential effects on
ongoing procedural and substantive reforms.
A. Rule 11
Section 104(B) of the CSLRA, which passed the House of
Representatives as Section 4 of the Attorney Accountability Act
("AAA") on March 7, 1995, would modify the 1993 amendment of Rule
11 in several important ways." 8 Section 104(B) of the CSLRA would
113. See, for example, Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1988) (allowing prevailing party to claim attorney's fees); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. § 2618(d) (1988) (allowing for reasonable attorney's fees where appropriate). See also
Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 313-17 (cited in note 3); Vargo, 42 Am.U. L. Rev. at 1587-89.
114. See notes 11-12, 14-16, 104 and accompanying text.
115. S.2180 § 3 (cited in note 92). See also notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
116. President's Council on Competitiveness, Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America
15-27 (G.P.O., 1991).
117. S. 2180 § 3 (cited in note 92).
118. H.R. 10 § 104(B) (cited in note 1); H.R. 988, § 4 (cited in note 1). See also note 120 and
accompanying text (describing two important additions included in H.R. 988).

722

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:699

have made judicial imposition of sanctions mandatory, rather than
discretionary, thereby reverting to the 1983 formulation, and would
have expressly provided that the sanctions for rule violations, in
addition to being "sufficient to deter," would be adequate to
"compensate the parties that were injured."' 9 Section 4 of the AAA
retains those requirements and would eliminate the provision in Rule
l1's 1993 amendment for safe harbors-which requires that targets
have notice of their alleged violations and twenty-one days to modify
or withdraw them-and would specifically make Rule 11 applicable to
discovery. 20
Several arguments support the changes that Section 104(B)
and Section 4 would institute. 21 First, the alterations would have
greater deterrent effect on those who might be tempted to contravene
Rule 11. Second, the modifications will afford increased incentives for
parties injured by Rule violations to invoke the provision.
Numerous complications attend the proposals to change the
1993 revision of Rule 11 by eliminating safe harbors, making the provision applicable to discovery, and making sanctioning compulsory
and compensatory. The legislation would reinstitute the most
problematic features of the 1983 amendment of Rule 11-the very
aspects that the national rule revisors intended the 1993 revision to
ameliorate. These include the incentives to invoke Rule 11 for
compensatory and tactical objectives, which can lead to unnecessary,
expensive satellite litigation and which can chill the enthusiasm of
certain parties, especially resource-poor litigants. 122 Adoption of the
changes could revive additional detrimental dimensions of the 1983
revision: the provision's threat and retreat aspect, its tendency to try
lawyers rather than cases, and the increased incivility that
necessarily attended the 1983 amendment's invocation.123 These

119. H.R. 10 § 104(B). See also 1983 amendment to F.R.C.P. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at
197 (making mandatory judicial imposition of sanctions).
120. See H.R. 988, § 4 (cited in note 1); note 51 and accompanying text (describing relevant
aspects of Rule 11's 1993 amendment).
121. I rely substantially in this paragraph on Dissenting Statement, 146 F.R.D. at 507-10
(cited in note 50); Floor Debate on H.R. 988, 141 Cong. Rec. H2663, H2664, H2675 (March 6,
1995) (WL 89571) (statements of Reps. Moorhead and Goodlate); Hearing on H.R. 10 Before the
Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Committee on the Judiciary
(testimony of Debra Ballen, Senior Vice President, American Insurance Association) (Feb. 6,
1995). See also Duncan, 81 A.BA. J. at 12 (cited in note 51) (discussing decline of sanctions
litigation due to the 1993 amendment of Rule 11).
122. See notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
123. See Tobias, 77 Iowa L. Rev. at 1785 (cited in note 36) (asserting all three propositions);
Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit 20-21 (April
1991) (asserting idea regarding Rule 11 and civility).
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difficulties would adversely affect parties, attorneys, and judges in
individual cases and the civil justice system as a whole.
As damaging as the above complications might be,
congressional passage of the legislation could have even more devastating impacts on the national rule revision process. 124 The 1993
amendment of Rule 11 resulted from a process in which the national
revision entities clearly identified a problem, carefully studied the
difficulty, drafted a proposal for change, solicited and considered
much public input, and laboriously drafted several additional proposals that the revisors believed were responsive to public comment and
represented the fairest, clearest amendment which could be developed. The revision eventually promulgated constituted the best effort
of the various committees and their expert advisors to treat equitably
all of the interests that the amendment would affect and to adopt a
workable compromise. The procedure that the rule revision entities
employed-inviting public scrutiny, fully considering public input,
and rewriting proposed changes in light of those suggestions--constituted the type of open, reasoned decisional process that
Congress envisioned in enacting the 1988 JIA.
Congressional reversal of four critical, well-considered features
of the improved Rule 11 within two years of the amendment's promulgation and before it has even had an opportunity to work would be
unfortunate, inadvisable, and deleterious for several reasons.
Legislative reversal would directly contravene one of the JIA's major
purposes, restoration of the primacy of the national rule revision
process. 125 Fundamental, peremptory congressional change in such
essential provisions of such a controversial rule following so closely
upon the conclusion of herculean efforts to improve the provision
could deal a crippling blow to the cause of national rule revision,
additionally wounding that process at a time of great vulnerability26
124. I rely substantially in this paragraph on notes 25-26, 30-31, 43-51, and accompanying
text.
125. See notes 25-26 and accompanying text. Legislative reversal would concomitantly
complicate federal civil litigation even more by requiring that attorneys closely monitor congressional legislation affecting procedure and learn about, understand, and comply with major

changes in a controversial Federal Rule less than two years after its substantial revision.
126. Some observers and I believe that the national rule revisors' decision to include an
opt-out provision in the disclosure amendment was a self-inflicted wound that seriously
undermined national uniformity and simplicity. See, for example, Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory
Disclosureand Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for OptionalRules, 14 Rev. Litig. 49, 51,
61 (1994) (arguing for more cautions by Advisory Committee and for nationally uniform
discovery rules). See generally Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145
F.R.D. 139 (1993).
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and demoralizing many who participated in the 1993 rules amendment process.
Passage of the legislation would also extend the unwise, disruptive practice of congressional intervention in the rule revision
process.127 Indeed, the American Bar Association House of Delegates

adopted a resolution admonishing Congress to reject the proposed
modifications in Rule 11 because "changes in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure... should be left to the existing rulemaking bod8
ies.''12
Enactment of the legislation would correspondingly extend the

inadvisable practice of overly frequent congressional intervention in
procedural policymaking, which passage of the 1988 and 1990 statutes epitomized.

29

B. Securities LitigationReform Act
Title II of the CSLRA, which passed in the House of
Representatives as the Securities Litigation Reform Act ("SLRA") on
March 8, 1995, would change securities litigation in a number of
significant ways. 30 The components of the proposed legislation which
are most relevant to the issues treated in this Essay are the

127. See notes 22-24, 59-62, and accompanying text.
128. See Brad Bole, Congress Again Takes Up "LegalReform", Litigation News 1, 6 (Feb.March 1995); Telephone Interview with Brad Bole, Echevarria Law Firm, Tampa, Fla. (Feb. 27,
1995).
129. See Tobias, 46 Stan. L. Rev. at 1599-1604 (cited in note 2) (discussing the 1988
Judicial Improvements Act and the 1990 Civil Justice Reform Act); notes 25-29, 54-70, and
accompanying text (same). Section 104 of the CSLRA also includes a subsection titled "Truth in
Attorneys' Fees." H.R. 10 § 104(a) (cited in note 1). That subsection provides that it is the
"sense of the Congress that each state should require" all practicing attorneys who are being
paid on a contingency fee basis to disclose to their clients the actual services performed and the
exact number of hours worked. H.R. 10 § 104(a)(1)-(2). The ostensible purpose of these requirements is to make lawyers more accountable to their clients. The strictures would probably
be expensive and difficult to enforce, while they may interfere with the attorney-client relationship. The final concern apparently led the ABA Litigation Section to oppose the concepts. See
Bole, Litigation News at 6 (noting that there was strong opposition to the disclosure policy
expressed at the Winter Council/Committee Chairs Meeting). The requirements, therefore,
might complicate the efforts of certain potential plaintiffs, such as resource-poor individuals
who have suffered personal injuries, to secure counsel, and may restrict federal court access.
The subsection might also have some effect on experimentation involving contingency fees
under the CJRA. See note 64 and accompanying text. These proposed requirements would not
interfere with state prerogatives because the legislation would appropriately defer to the states
in adopting and implementing the strictures. The House did not include this subsection in H.R.
988 as it passed. See notes 142-47, 154-62, and accompanying text (discussing additional provisions included in H.R. 988).
130. See H.R. 10 §§ 201-08; H.R. 1058 (cited in note 1). For a sense of the debate in legal
academia over the validity of securities litigation, see generally Joseph A. Grndfest, Why
Disimply?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727 (1995); Joel Seligman, The Merits Still Matter: A Rejoinder to
ProfessorGrundfest'sComment, Why Disimply?, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 748 (1995).
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imposition of special pleading and class action strictures in securities
cases and the requirement that losing litigants pay prevailing parties'
attorneys' fees in certain lawsuits. The changes are apparently intended to limit the amount of securities litigation, particularly the
cases that are lawyer-driven or that are brought to extract settlements.
Section 204 of the CSLRA and Section 4 of the SLRA would
place on plaintiffs specialized pleading requirements relating to scienter in actions brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.131 Mandating more rigorous pleading could discourage
plaintiffs from pursuing fraud claims and erode somewhat the statute's purposes. The imposition of particularized pleading may conflict
with the general notice pleading regime of the Federal Rules, which
the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, and undermines the Rules'
132
trans-substantive character.
Section 202 of the CSLRA would have required the appointment of a guardian ad litem or a plaintiff steering committee in securities class actions to prevent 'lawyer-driven litigation,"' 33 while Section 2 of the SLRA retains plaintiff steering committees 3 4 Section
203 of the CSLRA proposed additional strictures, such as the requirements that named plaintiffs have "meaningful investment[s]" in
class suits and that plaintiffs file no more than five actions during
any three-year period to prevent "abusive practices that foment litigation," 35 and Section 3 of the SLRA retains the numerical prohibition
on litigation.136 These strictures could have certain disadvantages
similar to those that specialized pleading entails. If enacted, the
requirements may dissuade potential plaintiffs from bringing actions
131. H.R. 10 § 204; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq (1988 &
Supp. 1993).
132. See Leatherman v. TarrantCounty Narcotics Intelligence and CoordinationUnit, 113
S. Ct. 1160, 1163 (1993) (stating that courts may not require a "heightened pleading standard");
Carl Tobias, The Transformationof Trans-Substantivity, 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1501 (1992)
(discussing trans-substantivity); Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev. at 296-301 (cited in note 3)
(discussing notice pleading regime). Federal Rule 9(b), which governs the pleading of fraud or
mistake, is the only provision in the federal rules that requires specialized pleading, but the
SLRA would impose more stringent pleading requirements. See generally Marcus, 86 Colum. L.
Rev. at 447-48 (cited in note 6).
133. H.R. 10 § 202 (cited in note 1).
134. Section 2 does not include the guardian ad litem requirement. See H.R. 1058, § 2
(cited in note 1).
135. H.R 10 § 203 (cited in note 1).
136. Section 3 does not include the meaningful investments requirement. See H.R. 1058 §
3 (cited in note 1). See also Pamela Coyle, When Bigger Isn't Better, A.B.A. J. 66, 72 (March
1995).
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and undercut the Securities Act's objectives while eroding the transsubstantive nature of Federal Rule 23.
The potentially corrosive effects on national rule revision appear more important, however. The adoption of special requirements
governing class actions could disrupt or at least undermine the efforts
of the Advisory Committee, its expert advisors, and the public-to
study Rule 23 conscientiously, to draft carefully comprehensive
changes in the class action device, and to circulate and seek comment
on several drafts-which have been proceeding for most of this dec37

ade.1

Section 3 of the SLRA could also make losing parties liable for
the attorney's fees that their adversaries incur. This fee-shifting provision is intended to afford an additional means of preventing
"abusive practices that foment litigation,"138 but it would probably
discourage plaintiffs from pursuing actions that could vindicate the
39
Securities Act's goals.
The imposition of numerous new requirements in securities
litigation may restrict access to federal courts in other ways that are
similar to those examined earlier. As with civil justice reform, lawyers and parties will have to learn about, understand, and conform to
the strictures, at the cost of scarce time and resources. 40 As with the
1983 amendment of Rule 11, the imposition of new requirements will
probably foster considerable expensive, unnecessary satellite litigation involving the strictures' meaning and application.41
137. Since the early 1990s, the Advisory Committee has worked assiduously on a proposal
that could comprehensively modify Federal Rule 23 governing class actions. See generally
Robert G. Bone, Rule 23 Redux: Empowering the FederalClass Action, 14 Rev. Litig. 79 (1994).
See also id. at 109-12 (reproducing current proposed amendment of Rule 23); id. at 80-81
(recounting three-decade history of controversy involving Rule 23 and proposals for its reform).
The committee has commissioned the Federal Judicial Center ("FJC"), an important research
arm of the federal courts, to undertake a thorough study of the class action device. Telephone
Interview with Thomas Willging, Deputy Research Director and Principal Researcher on Class
Action Study, FJC (Mar. 1, 1995). The committee has also developed several draft proposals of
an amendment, has sought input on those proposals from knowledgeable experts, conducted a
meeting devoted solely to Rule 23 in February 1995, and will probably publish a formal proposal
in the next year. See Bone, 14 Rev. Litig. at 80 n.3.
138. See H.R. 10 § 203 (cited in note 1); H.R. 1058 § 3 (cited in note 1). The fee-shifting
provision in H.R. 10 is less flexible than the one in H.R. 1058, which requires that the judge
determine that the losing party's position was not substantially justified, that imposing fees and
expenses on the loser would be just, and that the cost of the fees and expenses to the prevailing
party would be substantially burdensome or unjust. Of course, this phrasing could foster
satellite litigation over its meaning.
139. This provision, therefore, would have effects analogous to the strictures on securities
litigation that were discussed above. See notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
140. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
141. See notes 35-36 and accompanying text. H.R. 1058 includes a number of provisions
that were not in H.R. 10; however, they are less relevant to the issues treated in this Essay.
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C. FederalRule of Evidence 702

Section 102 of the CSLRA and Section 3 of the AAA would
amend Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in ways that restrict expert
testimony, ostensibly to increase "honesty in testimony."142 Section
102 would make admissible a witness's opinion testimony when premised on scientific knowledge only if the court decides that the opinion
is "(1) based on scientifically valid reasoning; and (2) sufficiently reliable so that the probative value of such evidence outweighs the dangers specified in rule 403."'14

Section 3 of the AAA retains the second

clause, changes the first clause to "scientifically valid and reliable,"
and adds a new clause requiring that there be a "valid scientific connection to the fact it is offered to prove."'"4
These requirements would probably complicate the efforts of
plaintiffs in cases that require testimony on novel or complex
scientific issues, such as products liability and environmental
litigation, to find experts who will testify and to prove their cases.
This could frustrate the efforts of plaintiffs in products liability and
environmental cases to function as private attorneys-general'5 and of
certain environmental plaintiffs to vindicate important purposes of
environmental statutes. The Supreme Court recently addressed
issues involving expert testimony that are so closely related to those
which the legislation implicates that the provision may merely be an
attempt to overturn the Court's ruling.146

Perhaps most significant, congressional amendment of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 would conflict with an ongoing reform initiative.
The suggested changes in Rule 702 seem perfectly appropriate for
142. See H.R. 10 § 102 (cited in note 1); H.R. 988 § 3 (cited in note 1).
143. See H.R. 10 § 102.
144. H.R. 988 § 3 (cited in note 1). See also note 138 (suggesting that phrasing would foster

satellite litigation).
145. Plaintiffs function as private attorneys-general by, for instance, filing litigation involving drugs or pollutants that the Food and Drug Administration or the Environmental Protection
Agency choose not to regulate or regulate with insufficient rigor. See Tobias, 74 Cornell L. Rev.
at 314-17 (cited in note 3) (discussing private attorneys-general in a civil rights context). See
generally Bryant Garth, et al., The Institution of the Private Attorney General: Perspectives
From an Empirical Study of Class Action Litigation, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 353 (1988) (discussing
private attorneys-general in a class action context). The phrasing employed in Section 3 of the
AAA would also foster considerable satellite litigation over its meaning.
146. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794, 2799 (1993)
(holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence provide the standard for admitting expert scientific
evidence in a federal trial). See generally Symposium, Scientific Evidence After the Death of
Frye, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1745-2294 (1994); Symposium, The Impact of Science and Technology
on the Courts,43 Emory L. J. 867-1122 (1994).
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treatment in the normal course of the rule revision process. Indeed,
during the 1990s, the national revision entities considered amending
Rule 702, while, in 1993, the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure referred the proposed alteration of the
provision to the newly-appointed Advisory Committee on Rules of
Evidence.

47

Legislative revision of this evidentiary rule would seriously
compromise the major purpose in recently constituting an Advisory
Committee on Rules of Evidence'4 and might undercut the committee
49
before it has had an opportunity to prove whether it is worthwhile.
In fact, the American Bar Association, when opposing congressional
amendment of Rule 702, emphasized that modification in the "Federal
Rules of Evidence should be left to the existing rulemaking bodies." 150
D. Notice Requirement
Section 105 of the CSLRA would require that plaintiffs afford
defendants actual notice "specifying the particular claims
alleged... and the amount of damages claimed" thirty days before
plaintiffs could file certain federal civil suits.' 5' An important
rationale for this stricture is that defendants who have such notice
will be encouraged to settle cases prior to their fling. The ostensible
purpose of the notice requirement, therefore, is to reduce the quantity
of federal civil litigation.
The thirty-day notice stricture would be unnecessary, ineffective, or detrimental in the overwhelming majority of situations in
which plaintiffs contemplate civil suit. In those potential cases which
are likely to settle because, for example, defendants have substantial
exposure based on clear liability or significant damages, it is already
good litigation practice for plaintiffs to notify defendants. For law147. See PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments, 137 F.R.D. at 156 (cited in note 43);
Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to FederalRules of Evidence, Excerpt from
the Report of the JudicialConference Committee on Rules of Practiceand Procedure,reprinted in
147 F.R.D. 275, 282 (1993) (stating that Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure "decided to refer the proposed amendment of Rule 702 to the new Advisory
Committee"). See generally Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the FederalRules of Evidence is
Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631 (1991).
148. See note 22.
149. See note 147.
150.' See Bole, Litigation News at 6 (cited in note 128). The legislation might also conflict
with ongoing executive branch reform relating to the government's reliance on expert witnesses.
See notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
151. H.R. 10 § 105 (cited in note 1). The notice provision is not included in the three bills
that passed the House during the week of March 6, 1995. Brief treatment is warranted here
because the Senate could revive notice and because executive branch reform includes it.
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suits which will probably not settle, plaintiffs will have to participate
in a fruitless, time-consuming, and expensive gesture that will prove
ineffective. In some instances, the notice may afford defendants certain tactical advantages, and in the worst cases it will provide defendants thirty additional days in which to destroy potentially damaging
evidence.
The limited information that is available on a similar notice
mechanism which has been experimented with under executive
branch civil justice reform confirms most of the propositions above. 152
This material suggests that the notice measure has had limited efficacy. 153 Finally, the differences between the executive branch notice
technique and the strictures in Section 105 of the CSLRA mean that
the two reforms could create confusion, expense, and delay by imposing inconsistent requirements in some civil cases.
E. Fee-Shifting in Diversity Cases
Section 101 of the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act
authorized judges to award reasonable attorney's fees to prevailing
parties in diversity cases and to exercise their discretion not to award
such fees or to reduce the amount when special circumstances make
awards unjust.154
The Securities Litigation Reform Act retains
somewhat similar provisions, 55 while Section 2 of the Attorney
Accountability Act replaces the fee-shifting requirement in section
101 of the CSLRA with a settlement offer provision that would modify
current Federal Rule 68 by prescribing fee-shifting in diversity
cases.'5

152. See notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
153. This assertion is premised on conversations with a number of individuals who are
familiar with executive branch civil justice reform.
154. H.R. 10 § 101 (cited in note 1).
155. See notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
156. H.R. 988 § 2 (cited in note 1). H.R. 10's fee-shifting provision is treated here because it
would have effects that are somewhat similar to fee-shifting in the SLRA and to the settlement
offer provision in the AAA. The Advisory Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 68 during
1983 and 1984, but it withdrew that proposal in the face of strong opposition. See Tobias, 74
Cornell L. Rev. at 310-19 (cited in note 3).
Since the late 1980s, the Advisory Committeee has been informally considering an
amendment to Rule 68; however, it has not officially published a proposed amendment. Judge
William Schwarzer recently suggested an amendment in Rule 68 which prescribes fee-shifting,

but that proposal includes more safeguards, such as exemptions for class actions, than the AAA
provision does. See generally William W Schwarzer, Fee-Shifting Offers of Judgment-An
Approach to Reducing the Cost ofLitigation, 76 Judicature 147 (1992).
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Section 101 of the CSLRA provides that "reasonable attorney's
fees" are the "actual cost incurred by the nonprevailing party for an
attorney's fee payable to an attorney in connection with [the] claim" or
a "reasonable cost that would have been incurred," had the party not
signed a contingency fee agreement. 157 One reason proffered for this
proposal is that it is fairer to permit parties that prevail in diversity
cases to seek recovery of attorney's fees. Another is that the
possibility that losing litigants will have to pay their opponents'
attorney's fees serves as a necessary deterrent to the pursuit of
frivolous actions.158
The most important criticism of Section 101 of the Common
Sense Legal Reforms Act is that it contradicts the premises,
principally implicating court access, that underlie the longstanding
American Rule. Indeed, the ABA's "longtime support for access to
courts and [opposition to] across the board 'loser pays' without regard
to subject matter" led the association to request that Congress reject
Section 101.159 Section 2 of the Attorney Accountability Act would
have similar, albeit somewhat less harsh, effects, even though the
provision lacks certain safeguards that have attended other proposals
to amend Rule 68.160
The fee-shifting and settlement offer proposals might limit
federal court access by engendering considerable unnecessary,
expensive satellite litigation. For instance, under numerous other
statutory schemes, questions regarding who is a prevailing party and
what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees have fostered much
satellite litigation, some of which has even reached the Supreme
Court. 16'

Section 101 of the CSLRA and Section 2 of the AAA could

also reduce access in cases that are close, complex, or difficult or
expensive to prove, or in which potential plaintiffs have little power or
157. H.R. 10 § 101 (cited in note 1). Section 2 of the AAA includes similar language, which
is equally susceptible to inconsistent interpretation and has similar propensities to foster
satellite litigation over its meaning.
158. Similar ideas seem to support Section 2 of the AAA. It may be fairer to allow plaintiffs
that "prevail" by exceeding the settlement offer at trial and defendants that prevail by limiting
plaintiffs' recovery to less than the settlement offer at trial to seek attorney's fees, while the
prospect of having to pay opponents' fees could deter the pursuit of frivolous claims or at least
encourage settlements.
159. Bole, Litigation News at 6 (cited in note 128).
160. It does have some safeguards, such as exemptions for claims seeking equitable relief.
See H.R. 988 § 2 (cited in note 1); note 156 (discussing proposal with greater safeguards).
161. See Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
788-93 (1989) (discussing eligibility for fee award as prevailing party under Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act); City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 577-80 (1986) (defining
reasonable attorney's fee under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act). See also note 51 and
accompanying text.
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money, because the exposure to liability for adversaries' attorney's
fees will chill possible parties' enthusiasm for filing or vigorously
pursuing litigation. Moreover, there is substantial difference between
losing a close case on the merits and pursuing frivolous litigation.
Parties who might serve as private attorneys-general in enforcing
product safety, environmental, or consumer protection laws or policies
may be especially susceptible to the effects examined in this
162
paragraph.
Insofar as the legislation prescribes fee-shifting in diversity
cases, it might also interfere with state prerogatives. To the extent
that provision for attorney fee-shifting is considered to be a matter of
state substantive law, Section 101 of the Common Sense Legal
Reforms Act would federalize an important area which traditionally
163
(and perhaps for constitutional reasons) has been left to the states.
Moreover, passage of Section 2 of the Attorney Accountability Act, like
the proposals to amend Federal Rule 11 and Federal Evidentiary Rule
702, would detrimentally affect the national rule revision process. 1'
For example, congressional amendment of Rule 68 would avoid the
national revision process and its provision for careful study of
proposed changes in the rules and for public notice and comment,
thereby subverting a critical purpose of the 1988 Judicial
165
Improvements Act.
F. ProductsLiability
Section 103 of the CSLRA would have instituted several rather
significant reforms of substantive products liability law.166 The
aspects of that section which are most important to this Essay are the
limitations on seller liability in numerous situations 167 and the

162. See note 145 and accompanying text.

163. The Supreme Court has stated that attorney's fees are a matter of state substantive
law. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 51-55 (1991) (recognizing that fee-shifting
rules are a substantive state policy); Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 259 n.31 (same); notes 81-83
and accompanying text (arguing that Section 101 could have interfered with executive branch
civil justice reform experimentation with attorney fee-shifting had Attorney General not found
lack of government authority to enter into fee-shifting agreements).
164. See notes 118-29, 142-50, and accompanying text; notes 159-60 and accompanying
text.
165. For instance, well-considered proposals to amend Rule 68 have been developed and are
currently being considered by the Advisory Committee. See notes 156 and 160; notes 124-29
and accompanying text.
166. See H.R. 10 § 103 (cited in note 1).
167. Id. § 103(B).
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requirements that punitive damages only be awarded upon proof of
actual malice by clear and convincing evidence and that such damages
be capped. 1' The Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform
Act ("PLLRA") essentially retains these provisions and introduces a
number of additional substantive and procedural changes. 169 The new
features of that bill which are most relevant to this Essay are the
imposition of defenses to products liability actions and a special Rule
170
11 governing frivolous products litigation.

The reasons advanced for restricting seller liability are that
sellers are sued in a substantial percentage of products cases but are
found liable in only a tiny number.' 7 ' The rationale for imposing limitations on punitive damages is that permitting juries to award these
damages, particularly under unclear or insufficiently rigorous
standards, unfairly exposes defendants to excessive liability.7

2

The

reasons afforded for the alcohol-use, misuse, and alteration defenses
are to encourage more careful consumer use of products and to limit
defendants' exposure to liability to situations which defendants can
control. 73 Imposition of a special Rule 11 in products actions is
174
justified by the ostensible need to deter frivolous suits.
Restricting seller liability can deprive plaintiffs of local
defendants that have profitted from the sale of allegedly defective
products; in some caess, these are the only parties that plaintiffs may
be able to hold responsible for their injuries. 175 The problem with
168. Id. § 103(C). See generally Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig, The Historical
Continuityof PunitiveDamages Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269
(1993) (providing historical and empirical information on punitive damages). See generally
Symposium, Punitive Damages Awards in Product Liability Litigation: Strong Medicine or
Poison Pill?,39 Vill. L. Rev. 353 (1994).
169. H.R. 956 (cited in note 1).
170. Id. §§ 103-104 (imposing defenses); id. § 105 (governing frivolous products litigation).
Section 106 includes a statute of repose; Section 102B precludes strict liability actions for
commercial loss; Section 107 prescribes litigation involving foreign products; Section 201 limits
punitive damage awards against drug manufacturers; and Section 202 limits liability of health
care providers.
171. See Wade, Schwartz, Kelly, and Partlett, Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases and
Materialson Torts at 795 n. 4 (cited in note 102).
172. Similar ideas underlie limitations on liability for health care providers and drug
manufacturers. See note 170.
173. The latter reason and fairness principles ostensibly support the imposition of a statute
of repose and limitations on drug manufacturer and health care provider liability. See note 170;
Brown v. SuperiorCourt,44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 482-83 (1988) (recognizing majority rule
of negligence for prescription drug manufacturers).
174. See note 170; notes 32-42, 118-29, and accompanying text.
175. The limitation on joint liability for noneconomic damages could exacerbate this situation. H.R. 10 § 103(D) (cited in note 1); H.R. 956 § 203 (cited in note 1). Section 102 of H.R.
956 makes sellers liable when manufacturers are not subject to service or cannot pay
judgments, while making sellers liable for express warranties. The defenses and the statute of
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imposing limitations on punitive damages in products liability and
medical malpractice cases is the loss of deterrence and punishment
that could be realized in those instances in which they are warranted.
These, and other, components of Section 103 of the CSLRA and of the
PLLRA may reduce federal court access and have related adverse
effects, such as limiting the number of cases in which plaintiffs serve
the positive function of private attorneys-general, as mentioned
176
above.
The provisions of Section 103 and of the PLLRA will probably
have additional detrimental impacts that are analogous to some
deleterious effects which other aspects of these two measures and
features of the AAA and the SLRA would impose. Substantive and
procedural products liability law, including punitive damages awards,
has traditionally been a matter of state law. For instance, limiting
recovery for commercial loss to contractual and commercial remedies
would modify the substantive law of approximately five states which
provide for strict liability in tort. 7 7 Insofar as Section 103 of the
CSLRA and the provisions of the PLLRA address these issues, they
will interfere with the prerogatives of state supreme courts and
legislatures. Perhaps the most egregious example of the legislation's
intrusive nature is its imposition of a special Rule 11 in products
liability cases even for states that have eschewed the adoption of a
Rule 11 modelled on Federal Rule 11.178 To the extent that the
legislation would change the substantive law of products liability, it
will also disrupt the ongoing efforts of the American Law Institute to
9
finalize Section 402A of the Restatement ThirdY7
Finally, the
congressional proposals cover only a small percentage of the issues
that arise in products liability litigation so that none of the bills
introduced will afford the type of national, uniform system of products

repose will complicate the recovery efforts by plaintiffs, many of whom have been badly injured
when using in reasonably foreseeable ways products which manufacturers might have designed
more safely.
176. See notes 145, 162, and accompanying text. The restrictions on noneconomic damages
and the limitations on drug manufacturers' liability could disproportionately disadvantage
women pursuing mass tort remedies. See Thomas Koenig and Michael Rustad, His and Her
Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 Wash. L. Rev. 1, 1-5 (1995). See also notes 170,
173, and 175.
177. See, for example, Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes, 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334,
337 (1982); Santorv. A & M Karagheusian,Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 267 A.2d 305, 312-13 (1965). See
generally EastRiver S.S. Co. v. Delaval Transamerica,Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
178. New York and Massachusetts have not adopted such a Rule 11. See also note 170.
179. See notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
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liability law which some of the legislation's proponents have
advocated.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Congress should reject or delay the adoption of the Common
Sense Legal Reforms Act and the Attorney Accountability Act, the
Securities Litigation Reform Act, and the Common Sense Product
Liability and Legal Reform Act that passed the House of
Representatives during the week of March 6, 1995, for numerous
reasons stated above. Perhaps most important, implementation of the
,CSLRA and the other legislation will interfere with, disrupt, or
jeopardize a number of ongoing reform initiatives. Congressional
passage in 1990 of the Civil Justice Reform Act within two years of
the Judicial Improvements Act's enactment trenchantly illustrates
the risks of legislating without sufficient appreciation of earlier
Even though the federal judiciary and Congress had
reforms.
identified local procedural proliferation as an important problem, and
although Congress had passed the 1988 JIA to address specifically
this difficulty, Congress enacted the 1990 CJRA, which effectively
suspended those aspects of the JIA which were meant to treat
proliferation before they were even implemented.
If Congress passes the CSLRA, the AAA, the SLRA, or the
PLLRA now, the legislation will interfere with some features of the
Civil Justice Reform Act before they have been fully implemented and
certainly before the results of procedural experimentation under the
CJRA have been thoroughly evaluated. Passage of the CSLRA or the
other legislation would disrupt additional continuing reform efforts,
such as the national rule revisors' endeavors to amend Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23 and the American Law Institute's attempt to adopt
a Restatement (Third) of Torts.180
The interference with these reforms and the imposition of new
requirements will increase complexity, expense, and delay in federal
civil litigation. The federal judiciary will have to interpret and apply
the strictures, while attorneys and parties must discover, understand,
and comply with the requirements. Indeed, CJRA experimentation
and the recently-adopted 1993 Federal Rules amendments may have
exhausted the tolerance of the bench and bar for procedural change;

180. See notes 105-10, 137, and accompanying text.
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the passage of the CSLRA, the AAA, the SLRA, or the PLLRA could
well constitute systemic overload.
Congress should also reject or delay the enactment of the
Common Sense Legal Reforms Act and the other legislation because
many of the legislation's procedural and substantive requirements
will have adverse effects in specific civil cases. For instance, the
provisions in the CSLRA and in the AAA relating to Rule 11, to feeshifting, and to settlement offers will restrict court access for lawyers
and parties whose lack of power and money makes them risk averse.
The impacts of disrupting processes and of imposing new
requirements mentioned in the three paragraphs above will have
similar effects, such as increasing expense and delay, in many
individual lawsuits.
Indeed, the Chair of the American Bar
Association Litigation Section aptly summarized many of the ideas
already stated when he characterized the proposed reforms as a "sort
of a hodgepodge attempt to address perceived problems with the legal
system. Quick-and-dirty solutions shouldn't be imposed where a more
thoughtful approach is clearly called for."18'
If Congress believes that the CSLRA or the other legislation
will have few detrimental effects in particular cases, on continuing
reforms, or on the civil justice process, or if it decides to proceed for
additional reasons, Congress should seriously consider several alternatives. Congress should not adopt the legislation's provisions that
will disrupt ongoing reform endeavors or it should at least suspend
passage until current efforts have terminated and their results have
been analyzed.
In less than a year, the ninety-four districts will have essentially concluded the most ambitious experimentation with civil expense and delay reduction procedures in the history of the federal
courts, while the RAND Corporation will have systematically collected, analyzed, and synthesized an enormous amount of empirical
information on the efficacy of this experimentation.182 Congress will
be able to undertake considerably more informed decision making
regarding certain requirements in the Common Sense Legal Reforms
Act, the Attorney Accountability Act, the Securities Litigation Reform
181. Bole, Litigation News at 6 (cited in note 128) (quoting David C. Weiner).
182. See Notes on Implementation of Plans accompanying 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1988 & Supp.
1993) (prescribing experimentation and evaluation). See generally Terence Dunworth and
James S. Kakalik, PreliminaryObservationson Implementation of the PilotProgramof the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1303 (1994) (providing preliminary results of
RAND's evaluation of the pilot program).
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Act, and the Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act
once Civil Justice Reform Act experimentation has been completed
and rigorously assessed. Congress should remember that efforts to
revise the Federal Rules without sufficient empirical data may have
yielded several of the most controversial amendments in the Rules'
half-century history.183 Awaiting the conclusion of the CJRA initiative
could afford the concomitant benefit of rectifying or ameliorating the
problems created by local procedural proliferation. Implementation of
the Judicial Improvements Act's aspects which were directed at these
complications, features which the CJRA essentially suspended, might
184
be revived and concluded.
Congress should not enact requirements in the CSLRA or the
other legislation that will conflict with continuing reform endeavors
for a number of reasons. The requirements' effectuation might forfeit
benefits to be derived from the reform efforts, could disrupt those
initiatives, and may increase complexity, cost, and delay in civil cases.
For instance, the adoption of special procedures for securities class
actions could frustrate and even sacrifice the considerable effort expended to date on Rule 23's comprehensive amendment. 185 The revision in the CSLRA and the AAA of Federal Rule 11 in ways that
would reinstitute the very phenomena which the national rule revisers found so troubling and assiduously labored to exclude from the
provision less than two years ago would eviscerate the 1993 amendment before the revision had an opportunity to work.'8 Moreover,
institution of the changes would unnecessarily compromise the national revision process at a critical juncture, when the authority and
respect that it has long enjoyed have been seriously threatened. 87
Legislating in the substantive area of products liability could undercut the American Law Institute's efforts to craft an improved
Restatement of Torts Third and interfere with state initiatives in the
area of products liability. 88
Congress might also want to consider the advisability of encouraging experimentation with certain of the requirements included
in the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act and the other legislation.
183. See Burbank, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1925-27 (cited in note 35); Linda S. Mullenix,
Discovery in Disarray: The PervasiveMyth of PervasiveDiscovery, Abuse and the Consequences
for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 1393 (1994); Walker, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 45659 (cited in note 48). See also notes 31-41, 57-61, and accompanying text.
184. See notes 27-29, 52-70, 90, and accompanying text.
185. See notes 130-41, and accompanying text.
186. See notes 32-51, 118-29, and accompanying text.
187. See note 129 and accompanying text.
188. See notes 99-110, 166-79, and accompanying text.
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Congress should remember that many states are currently
experimenting with numerous reforms. 89 If Congress believes that
these efforts are inadequate, it might want to sponsor some
initiatives. For instance, Congress could prescribe experimentation
with the thirty-day notice requirement or with fee-shifting that
involves settlement offers in diversity cases in certain federal districts
for a fixed period, although such experimentation might unfairly
penalize some litigants in those courts or foster forum shopping. This
program might be modeled on earlier projects involving court-annexed
arbitration, which proceeded in numerous federal districts,19° or on
CJRA experimentation. Congress could correspondingly provide for
broader experimentation by adopting a 1991 proposed amendment in
Federal Rule 83 which the national rule revisors withdrew. 191

V. CONCLUSION

The Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, and the Attorney
Accountability Act, the Securities Litigation Reform Act, and the
Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act that passed
the House of Representatives during the week of March 6, 1995,
would institute numerous procedural and substantive reforms that
would have many adverse effects in individual cases, on continuing
reform initiatives, and on the civil justice system. Congress should
not pass this legislation, or should at least suspend those provisions
which would interfere with ongoing reforms until these efforts have
concluded.

189. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text.
190. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1988). See generally Barbara S. Meierhoefer, Court-Annexed
Arbitration in Ten District Courts (Fed. Judicial Center, 1990) (examining arbitration in the
mandatory pilot programs).
191. I have suggested that congressional intervention in Rules revision is generally
inadvisable. Nevertheless, congressional adoption of this change in Rule 83 may be appropriate
because the rule revision entities had already proposed the amendment and because it would be
preferable to have congressional authorization for this specific change. See A. Leo Levin, Local
Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Division of Power, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1567, 1585-87
(1991). Districts that secured Judicial Conference approval would have been able to experiment
for not greater than five years with local rules that conflicted with Federal Rules. Preliminary
Draftof ProposedAmendments, 137 F.R.D. at 153 (cited in note 43). See also Tobias, 46 Stan. L.
Rev. at 1616, 1633 (cited in note 2) (discussing the proposed 1991 amendment in Rule 83).

